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Abstract 
This bachelor thesis deals with the question if social modernization in 
European Union member states influences the gender gap in voting 
behaviour of Members of the European Parliament. This question is used 
to analyze if Members of the European Parliament from member states 
with different levels of social modernization have different gender gaps 
in voting behaviour. The results of this study show that while social 
modernization influences the gender gap in voting behaviour, this 
influence is little. A better and significant explanatory factor for the 
gender gap in voting behaviour is the difference in ideological stances 
between male and female parliamentarians. 
 
Key words: parliamentary voting behaviour, gender gap, social 
modernization, ideological stances, European Parliament 
 
1 Introduction 
European societies have been changing structurally throughout the years and some 
European countries more than others. While in the beginning of the 20th century women 
in most European countries were not allowed to vote, in the second half of the 20th century 
women themselves could become representatives in the European Parliament (EP 
hereafter). The rise of gender equality has caused the role of women to become less 
traditional and more modern. This has also affected the voting behaviour of women. 
Before the 1980s, most women tended to vote for right-wing parties (Abendschön & 
Steinmetz, 2014). However since then women have been prone to vote for left-wing 
parties, while most men still tend to vote for right-wing parties (Inglehart & Norris, 2000). 
The changes in voting behaviour are also visible between parliamentarians, because both 
genders tend to favour different national political agendas (Taylor-Robinson & Heath, 
2003). The question that may come up in one’s mind then, is if this gender division in 
voting choices is also visible on an international scale. Since the gender gap is present on 
a national scale in European countries, it could be possible that the gap also applies to 
representatives of European countries in the EP. 
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If this turns out to be the case, the gender gap in voting behaviour might be 
explained by how modern societies are, more explicitly by a country’s level of social 
modernization. The link between social modernization and the gender gap in voting 
behaviour has been made before by academics. The theory that modernization influences 
the gender gap in voting behaviour was coined by Inglehart & Norris and is known as the 
developmental theory (2000, p. 442). Several studies have looked into the relation between 
the developmental theory and the gender gap in voting behaviour, but these studies are 
limited to national elections. Even though social modernization has explained the voting 
behaviour of parliamentarians in national parliaments, this theory has never been applied 
beyond the national scale. Therefore, it is unknown to what extent the influence of this 
theory is visible in international parliaments. One of the international parliaments which 
has enough data available to study this phenomenon and has not yet enjoyed scholarly 
interest in this area of analysis is the European Parliament (EP).  
 
To examine if this theory is not limited to a national level, the following research question 
was created: “To what extent does social modernization influence the gender gap in voting 
behaviour in the European Parliament?” 
 
Research on the gender gap in voting behaviour in the EP is relevant for the following 
reasons. As stated previously, the developmental theory has provided explanations for the 
gender gap in voting in national parliaments, but not for international cases. To the best 
of my knowledge, no study has been conducted on explaining a gender gap in voting 
behaviour in an international parliament by focussing on social modernization. 
Knowledge on the effects of the developmental theory in international parliaments is 
insufficient, which adds to the scientific relevance of this study. In specific, this study 
contributes to the reduction of the academic gap in the field, since it is unknown if the 
developmental theory can be applied beyond the scope of national parliaments.  
The interesting aspect of international parliaments is that parliamentarians from 
countries with different levels of social modernization vote on the same issues in the same 
parliament. This amount of variation is not present in national parliaments. Therefore it 
can lead to new and interesting insights for the academic debate. By explaining how and 
to what extent the voting behaviour of female and male Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs hereafter) differ, this study contributes to the academic debate. 
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Moreover, this study contributes to the social relevance by providing insights on if 
the democratic representation is at stake in the EP. If there is an indication that there is 
indeed a gender gap, this can become a democratic issue. In a democratic society, each 
citizen should have an equal chance of representation in the parliament. A majority of the 
female voters favours same-gender descriptive representation, because they believe that 
female parliamentarians share similar policy stands on issues that are related to women’s 
rights (Rosenthal, 1995, p. 606). In countries where there are many female 
representatives, left-wing policies are more prioritized than in countries with fewer female 
representatives (Taylor-Robinson & Heath, 2003). There can be stated that women favour 
female representatives, because they prioritize other policies than men (Tremblay, 1998). 
This might lead to undesirable outcomes and can be harmful for democracy if people 
believe that they are only represented by someone of the same gender or if one gender is 
solely represented by the other gender. That is why there should be analyzed if descriptive 
representation exists in the EP.  
This study also reveals how large the differences in political stances are between 
men and women, which follows up and contributes to the academic debate and societal 
relevance. There are many discussions about the importance of female representation and 
if gender quotas should be necessary (Clayton, 2015; Dahlerup, 2007; Lovenduski, 2005). 
Studies have shown that there is an increase of descriptive representation in parliaments, 
but not one parliament is the perfect representation of the electorate (Bowen & Clark, 
2014; Galligan, 2013; Gwiazda, 2014). Hakhverdian (2017) argues about the importance of 
recognition in the form of descriptive representation. He specifically mentions the large 
differences in higher education between Dutch parliamentarians (90%) and the Dutch 
electorate (30%) and believes that this is a problem. People with higher degrees tend to 
think differently than people with lower degrees and the same idea is applicable to other 
groups such as men and women (Van Den Brink, 2017). This study reveals if this is the 
case.   
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2 Theory 
2.1 Social modernization and the gender gap in voting behaviour 
The main causal relationship in this study is the influence of social modernization on the 
gender gap in voting behaviour. The concept “gender gap” was created in the 1980s to 
describe the distance between the voting choices of men and women (Giger, 2009). The 
term “gender gap in parliamentary voting behaviour” indicates the distance in voting 
choices between male and female parliamentarians. 
Governmental social spending has been increasing since universal suffrage in 
European societies (Aidt & Dallal, 2008). Despite the fact that women’s voting choices 
changed from more right-wing to more left-wing in the 1980s, before the 1980s social 
spending was still increasing (Aidt & Dallal, 2008, p. 413; Inglehart & Norris, 2003). One 
of the explanations for this could be that most women are often more tend than men to be 
in favour of policies that are based on the ethics of caring, which translates into sympathy 
for the disadvantaged (Cook & Wilcox, 1991). In traditional societies, the disadvantaged 
are often women because of the different gender roles. Differentiated gender roles 
discourage women from jobs outside the home and limit their choices (Giger, 2009, p. 480). 
Especially in religious households where traditional family attitudes and non-political 
roles for women are more encouraged (Inglehart, Norris & Welzel, 2002, p. 323; Rule, 
1987, p. 484).  
Women believe that female politicians are best equipped to represent women’s 
interests (Wängnerud, 2009, p. 52). This idea influenced the descriptive representation of 
women. Reingold (2000, p. 14) argues that female parliamentarians are more able to 
represent women, because they are more willing to fight for female interests than their 
male counterparts. Female parliamentarians have indeed been trying to shape political 
agendas in order to promote women’s issues (Tremblay, 1998; Swers, 2002). Female 
parliamentarians in contrary to male parliamentarians more actively promote women’s 
issues, which are mainly based on increasing gender equality (Bratton, 2005; Wängnerud, 
2009, p. 53). One way of expressing the concern for more gender equality in parliaments is 
by increasing awareness of labour market discrimination (Edlund & Pande, 2002). The 
changes in European societies’ structure have led to a rise of female labour force 
participation, including in parliaments, and this could reduce female disadvantage in the 
working force. As a matter of fact, the presence and influence of women in 
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parliamentarians has actually affected their political agenda-setting capability in favour 
of women’s interests (Atkeson & Carrillo, 2007). Howbeit, if women’s concerns were 
already on the political agenda, reasons for women to vote differently than men would 
likely reduce. For this to happen, women’s issues would need to be promoted in 
parliaments and a rise in the number of female parliamentarians could help with that. 
The percentage of female parliamentarians varies per country and influences their 
capability to put women’s issues on the political agenda. Women have never achieved a 
gender equal representation in any national parliament, but Scandinavian countries have 
the most gender-balanced parliaments, with Sweden leading the world (Norris & 
Inglehart, 2001, p. 127). In culturally traditional societies, where there are fewer women 
in the workforce, most superiors view women on the basis of gender stereotypes and 
evaluate their actions as evidence (Bratton, 2005, p. 98). Therefore, when women enter a 
workforce that is dominated by men, they are likely to downplay gender differences in 
order to blend into the predominant male culture (Kanter, 1977, p. 973). Thus, cultural 
differences can influence the behaviour of women in parliaments to become more similar 
to that of men. It can also explain the variation of female parliamentarians between 
countries. According to Norris & Inglehart (2001) the number of female parliamentarians 
is influenced by traditional attitudes toward gender roles. Countries with a more 
egalitarian culture have more women in parliament (Norris & Inglehart, 2001, p. 134). 
Ergo, in culturally traditional societies where women have differentiated roles, there are 
fewer women in parliaments, which subsequently leads to fewer women’s issues on the 
political agenda, and reduces the reasons for women to vote differently than men. 
Hence, I argue that in a traditional society, there is a smaller gender gap in voting 
behaviour. On the other hand, I assume that in a society that is becoming less traditional, 
the gender gap is becoming larger. In culturally modern societies, women are more 
descriptively represented in parliaments, which increases their chances of putting 
women’s issues on the political agenda. This leads to the following linear hypotheses: 
 
H1: in European Union (EU) member states where there is a low level of social 
modernization, the gender gap in voting behaviour is expected to be small between MEPs 
of the member state. 
 
H2: in EU member states where the level of social modernization is rising, the gender gap 
in voting behaviour is expected to become larger between MEPs of the member state. 
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On the other hand, I assume that the linear pattern becomes non-linear over time. In 
other words, when a society’s structure has become modern, the gender gap in voting 
behaviour becomes smaller. This means that in the results an inverted u-shape is 
expected.  
There will be fewer reasons for women to have a different voting behaviour than 
men when the issues that are important for women are already dealt with. Women’s 
issues are often regarded as left-wing issues and if a country has reached a gender equal 
society, reasons for women to join left-wing parties reduces. Thus, the changing structure 
from traditional to less traditional leads to a smaller gender gap for the reason that social 
development in the form of modernization moderates political polarization (Dalton, 2006, 
p. 8). Therefore I expect the following: 
 
H3: in EU member states where there is a high level of social modernization, the gender 
gap in voting behaviour is expected to become smaller between MEPs of the member 
state. 
 
The term “social modernization” was first used by Giger (2009) to analyze the gender gap 
in voting behaviour. In this study, the two cultural characteristics on which “social 
modernization” are related to gender. The first is based on women’s issues in the form of 
‘gender equality’. The second is how traditional the role of women is in the form of 
‘attitude towards women’. The conceptualization of “social modernization” by Giger (2009) 
is based on similar indicators. The indicators by Giger (2009, p. 475) are paid labour force 
for women (1), improved educational opportunities (2) and changing characteristics of 
modern families (3). The same indicators are in a different way presented in this study. 
The first two indicators are used as two of the six elements of gender equality and what 
Giger (2009) calls ‘changing characteristics of families’ is included in society’s attitude 
towards women.  
The concept “social modernization” is based on the developmental theory by 
Inglehart & Norris (2000, 2003) and rests on the idea that cultural structures used to be 
more traditional. Inglehart & Norris (2003) mention that weakening traditional 
conservatism is a characteristic of modernization and leads to more gender equal roles. 
According to Inglehart & Norris (2000, p. 443) cultural changes in societies cause a 
transformation in the values of men and women. This is visible in the voting behaviour of 
male and female representatives, which changed more over time (Taylor-Robinson & 
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Heath, 2003). If the modernization of societies’ cultural structures causes more equal 
values about the role of women, a rise in the number of female parliamentarians will be 
likely and thus a change in the gender gap in voting behaviour as well. The changing 
values can also make opportunities in the paid workforce more equal. Reynolds (1999) 
concludes in his study that countries show lower activities of women working for the 
government if religion has a strong cultural presence. Accordingly, a strong religious 
country indicates a culturally traditional society, in which there are fewer gender equal 
opportunities and thus fewer female parliamentarians. However, a change in the 
importance of religion in culture could modernize societies and create more equal 
attitudes and opportunities.  
2.2 Social modernization, ideological stances and the gender gap in voting 
behaviour  
 The second relationship is the influence of ideological stances on the gender gap in voting 
behaviour through social modernization. A number of other factors can influence the 
voting behaviour of MEPs (Hix, 2004). There are many discussions, but a majority of the 
studies states that national political parties and European Political Groups (EPGs) mostly 
influence the voting choices of MEPs (Cencig & Sabani, 2016; Finke, 2014; Gische, 2007; 
Hix & Noury, 2009; Hix, Noury & Roland, 2009). Party loyalty plays a part in this, but 
Hix, Noury & Roland (2009, p. 831) believe that MEPs are starting to vote more in line 
with EPGs than national parties. One of the incentives for this behaviour is that EPGs 
are not punished by an electorate when they are divided on issues, because citizens are 
not well informed about activities in the EP (Hix, Noury & Roland, 2009). National 
interests of countries also influences MEPs’ voting behaviour (Cicchi, 2013). 
This study takes into account previous studies by looking into the national political 
parties of MEPs. In specific, the left-right stances of MEPs based on their national parties. 
Political positions and preferences are frequently expressed in left-right terms (De Vries, 
Hakhverdian & Lancee, 2013, p. 225). The main dimension of explaining voting behaviour 
in the EP is the left-right dimension, because MEPs predominately vote along these 
ideological lines (Hix, Noury & Roland, 2007). It could be the case that the gender gap in 
voting behaviour is influenced by the left-right ideological stances of MEPs. The gender 
gap and social modernization are country-level variables, which is why there was chosen 
to opt for ideological stances based on a country-level variable. Additionally, the ideological 
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stances of MEPs are more specific if the focus is on the left-right positions of national 
parties instead of the left-right positions of EPGs. 
Women in European societies are leaning more to left-wing parties in their voting 
choices, since women’s issues are seen as left-wing issues (Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014, 
P. 318). Female MEPs also believe that as political representatives their role includes 
ensuring that women’s rights are adequately represented (Freedman, 2002; McEvoy, 
2016). Therefore, I assume that the ideological stances of MEPs play an important part in 
explaining the gender gap in voting, because the latter insinuates that female MEPs are 
more inclined to vote for left-wing issues when these are about women’s concerns. The 
reason for female MEPs to vote for left-wing issues can be related to modernization. As 
paragraph 2.1 shows, higher social modernization can cause an increase in female 
parliamentarians and female parliamentarians want to represent women’s concerns, a 
subject often regarded as a for left-wing issue. This can cause women to opt for left-wing 
parties and create a larger gender gap in voting. Therefore, ideological stances could be a 
mediator: the influence of social modernization can be indirect through the left-wing and 
right-wing positions of MEPs on the gender gap in voting behaviour. 
 
H4: in EU member states where the level of social modernization is becoming higher, 
there will be larger ideological differences between female and male MEPs, which will 
lead to larger gender gaps in voting behaviour between MEPs of the member state. 
 
As a clarification, the essence of the theoretical framework is captured in figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: diagram of the proposed causal relationships in this study 
 
Gender gap in voting 
behaviour 
 
dependent variable 
Social modernization 
 
independent variable 
Ideological stances 
 
mediator variable 
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3 Case selection 
This study is a quantitative analysis in which the focus of interest is the EP. The main 
reason for choosing the EP is because it is the most advanced international parliamentary 
assembly (De Puig, 2008, p. 58). Even though the EP does not have all the attributions of 
a national legislate assembly, it is one of the few international parliaments that functions 
similar to a national parliament (De Puig, 2008, p. 64). Another reason for what makes 
the EP an interesting case is that in Europe, parliaments have one of the most gender 
equal distributions worldwide (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2017). In 1979 only 16% of 
MEPs was woman, but this percentage has been increasing and is now close to 40% 
(European Parliament, n.d.). Moreover, the EP has many member states, which have a 
certain degree of variation in social modernization, making it an interesting case. 
Additionally, it is one of the few international parliaments where MEPs are elected by 
universal suffrage (International Democracy Watch, n.d.). Universal suffrage, the 
variation, the good functioning and transparency are how the EP gets its legitimacy 
(Maurer, 2003, p. 82). The transparency is also the main reason for why data on the voting 
choices of MEPs was easy to access. 
The emphasis is on the sixth European Parliament (EP6) (2004-2009). The most 
recent and available data on the voting behaviour of MEPs is from the sixth term, which 
is why EP6 is chosen for the analysis. The gender gap can be aggregated to the country-
level and in EP6 there are 27 member states (N=27). Unfortunately, some member states 
cannot be included in every variable. This is because some countries do not have female 
MEPs, therefore the “gender gap” in voting behaviour cannot be measured. Also, for some 
countries data on left-right wing positions of parties is not available. That is why in the 
end it is not possible to provide a conclusion for Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg.  
Furthermore, the number of analyzed parliamentarians is more than one might 
expect. There were a few changes in EP6, which led to a rise in the number of MEPs. 
Between 2004 and 2006 the total number of parliamentarians was 732, but when 
Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union in 2007, this led to an increase of 785 
MEPs between 2007 and 2009. In total, the voting behaviour of 940 MEPs is analyzed, 
which leaves 155 unexplained parliamentarians. This is the number of incumbent 
parliamentarians that were replaced for reasons including, but not limited to, death or 
changes in profession. 
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4 Research design, operationalization, and methods of data 
collection 
This research utilizes a quantitative approach. The design of this study is a large N-
design of MEPs’ gender gap in voting behaviour during EP6. In the next sections, the 
variables that are the focus in the statistical analysis are discussed. Each subsection 
describes for each variable how the data was collected and how the variables are 
operationalized.  
4.1 Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable is the gender gap in voting behaviour of MEP’s. For this variable, 
the different voting patterns of female and male MEPs during the roll-call votes (RCVs) in 
the EP is analyzed. A RCV is a vote in which the names of the MEPs are recorded along 
with the vote (Cherepnalkoski, Karpf, Mozetic & Grcar, 2016, p. 27). With RCVs the 
differences can precisely be measured. For this purpose I draw on the data on RCVs 
collected by Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland. This dataset has a total number 
of 6200 RCVs. In three RCVs (of which two were the last RCVs of EP6) there were almost 
no parliamentarians present. The values for those RCVs are therefore not available. By 
leaving those out, the total number of RCVs used to calculate the Phi (φ) values is 6197.  
 
The central measure in this study is the Phi (φ) coefficient. A bivariate analysis is 
conducted where the Phi coefficient is used to analyze the relationship between voting 
behaviour (in favour, against or abstention) and gender (male or female). With the use of 
cross tables, the Phi values are calculated for 6197 RCVs. After this is calculated for each 
vote, the average of all votes is measured for each country separately. This measure is not 
known as a standard measure and might not be completely straightforward. For this 
reason an example is provided on how this method is utilized in this study. For instance, if 
the MEPs of Austria and Hungary were to cast their vote during a RCV, it could look as 
presented in tables 1 and 2. 
 
In the cross table in table 1, there is no relation in the voting behaviour and a gender gap. 
Both male and female MEPs vote similarly during this specific RCV. Therefore, the value 
of Phi results in φ=0. 
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Table 1: relation between the gender gap and the voting behaviour of MEPs in Austria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In table 2, male and female MEPs do not vote similarly during the RCV. This results in a 
gender gap in voting behaviour. In this cross table φ=1, which indicates a perfect relation 
between a gender gap and parliamentary voting behaviour.  
 
Table 2: relation between the gender gap and the voting behaviour of MEPs in Hungary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The method of using Phi values to analyze the voting decisions of groups was first utilized 
by Van Aelst & Louwerse (2013). Van Aelst & Louwerse (2013, p. 482) calculated 
coefficients of association between members’ voting decision in a given vote and their 
party’s left-right position, language group and if they are part of the opposition or 
coalition. However, the use of this method first came into mind after reading the study by 
Louwerse, Otjes, Willumsun & Öhberg (2016) where this method was also utilized. In 
their study the groups are government and opposition, while in this study the groups are 
men and women.  
My supervisor, Tom Louwerse, assisted me in running the calculation of the Phi 
values for each vote and country in R as this could not be accomplished in SPSS. In table 
3, the Phi values are presented, positioned from high to low averages per country, as well 
as the number of MEPs per country. An important aspect to note is that the Phi values for 
Cyprus and Malta are not available. These countries only have male MEPs, which is an 
interesting case on itself. Since there is no data on these countries, no conclusions can be 
                                       Voting behaviour 
 
Gender 
 
Total RCVs 
 In favour Against  Abstention Total MEPs 
Male 50% 50% 0% 13 
Female  50% 50% 0% 7 
 10 10 0 20 
                                       Voting behaviour 
 
Gender 
 
Total RCVs 
 In favour Against  Abstention Total MEPs 
Male 100% 0% 0% 19 
Female  0% 100% 0% 9 
 19 9 0 28 
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drawn about the gender gap in voting behaviour and there can only be speculated. 
Without Cyprus and Malta the average European Phi value is 0.11. On a scale from 0 to 1 
this is on the low side, but it proves that the gender gap in the voting behaviour is 
present. There are a few outliers in table 3. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
have the highest Phi values in contrast to Estonia and Slovenia. This division could be 
traced back to the traditional differences in that West European societies are based on 
Christian traditions and East European societies were separated from the West and 
influenced by decades of communism (Welzel, 2013). 
 
Table 3: average Phi values per member state in EP6 
Country Phi values Male MEPs Female MEPs Total MEPs 
United Kingdom 0.31 62 21 83 
Netherlands 0.17 18 14 32 
Ireland 0.15 9 5 14 
Belgium 0.14 17 8 25 
Germany 0.14 73 33 106 
Denmark 0.13 12 7 19 
France 0.13 50 40 90 
Latvia 0.12 7 3 10 
Czech Republic 0.11 19 5 24 
Greece 0.11 21 10 31 
Italy 0.11 91 23 114 
Romania 0.11 50 15 65 
Slovakia 0.11 9 5 14 
Sweden 0.11 11 11 22 
Hungary 0.10 19 9 28 
Portugal 0.10 21 6 27 
Austria 0.09 13 7 20 
Bulgaria 0.09 18 11 29 
Poland 0.09 51 10 61 
Lithuania 0.08 9 5 14 
Finland 0.07 10 7 17 
Luxembourg 0.07 3 3 6 
Spain 0.07 44 18 62 
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Estonia 0.02 4 3 7 
Slovenia 0.02 5 3 8 
Cyprus - 6 0 6 
Malta - 6 0 6 
4.2 Independent Variable  
The independent variable is the level of social modernization and has two indicators. For 
the first indicator of social modernization, gender equality, the Gender Equality Index 
(GEI) is used. For the second indicator of social modernization, attitude towards women in 
societies, the European Values Study (EVS) is used. In the next table, the scores of both 
indicators are provided and ordered for each member state. The positioning on the scale is 
relative since it is a comparison between member states of the European Union only. The 
second column presents the gender equality score of a country where a high score means a 
small gender equality gap and a low ranking a large gender equality gap. The values in 
the third column are arranged in a way that a high value means a traditional view on 
women and a low value a more progressive view on women.  
 
Table 4: scores of member states on gender equality and attitudes towards women  
Member state Gender equality Attitude towards women 
Austria 49.1 0.47133 
Belgium 58.3 -0.80409 
Bulgaria 38.1 -0.48229 
Cyprus 42.6 1.34820 
Czech Republic 42.1 0.27440 
Denmark 72.1 -2.21880 
Estonia 49.7 0.28846 
Finland 71.4 -1.22754 
France 55.9 -1.42020 
Germany 49.9 -0.13850 
Greece 39.8 1.03484 
Hungary 42.0 0.28495 
Ireland 55.1 0.09619 
Italy 39.6 1.60397 
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Latvia 45.3 0.04324 
Lithuania 42.2 0.84591 
Luxembourg 50.1 -1.04041 
Malta 42.4 1.76965 
Netherlands 69.1 -0.71256 
Poland 43.0 1.04891 
Portugal 40.1 0.36304 
Romania 35.0 1.03484 
Slovakia 39.8 0.05765 
Slovenia 54.9 -0.28911 
Spain 53.7 -0.85239 
Sweden 74.4 -1.46925 
United Kingdom 58.9 0.08955 
4.2.1 Indicator 1: gender equality 
The indicator ‘gender equality’ makes use of the GEI, which is created by the European 
Institute for Gender Equality. GEI consists of six domains: Work, Money, Knowledge, 
Time, Power and Health (Humbert, Ivaskaite-Tamosiune, Oetke, & Paats, 2015, p. 12). 
Each domain has two indicators (Humbert et al., 2015). The indicators of the first domain 
are participation, segregation and quality of work. The second domain’s indicators are 
‘financial resources’ and ‘economic situation’. The indicators of ‘Knowledge’ are 
‘attainment and segregation’ and ‘‘lifelong learning’. The domain ‘Time’ is measured by the 
time spent on care activities and social activities. The domain ‘Power’ is measured by 
analyzing the political and economic power of men and women. Finally, the domain 
‘Health’ is measured by status and access to healthcare. The results for each single 
domain are not presented, because they are publicly available. The overall scores on the 
domains are used to calculate the averages for each country and are presented in table 4. 
When the average of each country is measured, it leads to an average European 
score of 52.1. The highest positions are obtained by the three Nordic member states and 
the lowest scores are those of the newest member states and Italy. What might be 
unexpected is Italy’s ranking. This can be explained by the fact that religious societies 
tend to have more traditional cultural structures and Italy has one of the largest Catholic 
societies in the West (Welzel, 2013, p. 30). The literature also stated in religious societies 
fewer women work for the government and non-political roles are more encouraged for 
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women (Inglehart, Norris & Welzel, 2002; Reynolds, 1999). The positioning might also 
have to do with the strength of emancipation movements. According to Welzel (2013, p. 31) 
in the Reformed West (including Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Great Britain, and Ireland), emancipation movements were stronger than in the Old 
(Catholic) West (France, Italy, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and 
Spain). Furthermore, societies in the Orthodox East (Bulgaria and Romania) were even 
shielded from the West’s emancipation movements, which can explain the positions of the 
newest member states. 
4.2.2 Indicator 2: attitude towards women  
The second indicator of social modernization is the attitude towards women in European 
societies. Answers to the 2008 large-scale cross-national survey by EVS are used to get 
insights on the beliefs and opinions of citizens. The EVS survey is divided into ten topics: 
perceptions of life, religion, family and marriage, politics and society, moral attitudes, 
national identity, environment, demography and social origin and partner (EVS, 2011). 
From these topics, only ‘family and marriage’ looks into the attitudes towards women. The 
other topics are excluded from this indicator, because they do not indicate how citizens 
from European countries view women in their society. Within this topic, there are nine 
relevant questions which can indicate the attitude towards women. The questions are 
retrieved from the integrated dataset of EVS (GESIS, 2016). From each question the most 
commonly answered option is used to indicate the attitudes towards women in European 
societies. The coding of the answers in the dataset of EVS has not changed for the data 
analysis. This means that higher values for attitudes towards women correspond with 
more traditional views and insinuates lower social modernization. Low values on the 
other hand suggest more modern views and thus higher social modernization. 
 
The following questions were selected from the EVS survey: 
1. If women need children in order to be fulfilled 
2. If women should be allowed to have a child when they are a single parent and  do 
not have a stable relationship with a man 
3. If women have a duty towards society to have children 
4. If women can decide for themselves whether to have children or not 
5. If a working mother can establish a just as warm and secure relationship with her 
children as a mother who does not work 
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6. If a child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works 
7. A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children 
8. If abortion can be approved if a woman is not married  
9. If a job is the best way for women to become independent  
 
The most common method to measure the overall reliability of the scale is by using 
Cronbach’s Alpha (α) (Field, 2009, p. 674). The reliability analysis shows that the 
variables have a Cronbach’s Alpha value of 0.724, which means that the chosen variables’ 
internal consistency is high and suggests that the amount of covariance between the 
variables is reliable. After the selection of the variables, a factor analysis is conducted to 
test how closely the individual questions are related to the indicator (Hof, 2012; Yong & 
Pearce, 2013). This is done to make sure that the questions measure societies’ attitude 
towards women.  
The factors analysis showed that the selected variables can be deemed valid. This 
means that a country’s score on the variables sufficiently represents the underlying 
construct which is societies’ attitude towards women. The principal component analysis 
(PCA) has also been used to eliminate the multiple dimensions of the variables. The goal 
of PCA is to explain the maximum amount of variance with the fewest number of principal 
components. Thus, the PCA needs to come up with one dimension, which summarizes as 
much of the variation in the nine variables. The resulting scores on this dimension are 
standardized (mean = 0, sd = 1) and are presented in table 4.  
Similar to GEI, the most progressive scores are obtained by the Nordic countries. 
However, the countries with the lowest scores have changed a bit. Italy still has one of the 
lowest positions, but Malta and Cyprus have joined Italy as ‘most traditional’. This could 
be because Malta and Cyprus also belong to the Old West, which as previously stated had 
weaker emancipation movements than the Reformed West (Welzel, 2013). Another 
possible reason is that Mediterranean countries value close family relations and religion 
more than centre and northern European countries (Gal, 2010; Reher 1998). 
4.3 Mediator Variable  
The mediator variable is the ideological stance of female and male parliamentarians and 
is measured on a left-right scale. The national political parties of MEPs are used to 
examine if MEPs are either affiliated with left-wing or right-wing parties.  
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 The reason for the use of this variable is because the literature shows that female 
electorates in relatively more modern European societies tend to vote for left-wing parties 
and also care about descriptive representation (Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014; Bratton, 
2005; Inglehart & Norris, 2000; Reingold, 2000; Rosenthal, 1995; Wängnerud, 2009). 
Hence, it would seem logical if the majority of female representatives are members of left-
wing parties. In general, left-wing parties tend to be more progressive on issues such as 
gender equality while right-wing parties are more traditional. Therefore I consider the 
possibility that most female MEPs, are more likely to be in favour of left-wing policies 
when it comes to women’s rights policies. I also assume that left-wing male MEPs vote 
similarly when it comes to these topics. To see if the mediator can explain the gender gap 
in voting, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey is used.  
The Chapel Hill Expert Survey estimates party positioning of national political 
parties from European countries with the use of a number of issues (Bakker, De Vries, 
Edwards, Hooghe, Jolly, Marks, Polk, Rovny, Steenbergen, Vachudova, 2015). There is one 
specific variable in the survey that is useful for this study, which is called ‘lrgen’ (left right 
general). This variable measures the ideological stances of national parties on a general 
left-right scale. Other variables such as GAL-TAN or Economic Left-Right might seem 
plausible to use as well at first sight. The acronyms GAL and TAN stand for “Green, 
Alternative, Liberal” and “Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalism” (Bakker et al., 2015). 
GAL parties support more expansive personal freedoms, while TAN parties reject these 
ideas, and belief that the government should be a strong moral authority that favours law 
and order and tradition (Bakker, Jolly, & Polk, 2012). Economic Left-Right leaves out any 
social issues and only classifies parties in terms of their stance on economic issues. With 
Economic Left-Right, parties on the economic left spectrum want the government to have 
an active role in the economy and parties on the want the government to have a reduced 
economic role (Bakker, Jolly, & Polk, 2012). The reason for neither using GAL-TAN nor 
Economic Left-Right is because General Left-Right is the most used explanatory 
dimension for voting behaviour (De Vries, Hakhverdian & Lancee, 2013; Hix & Noury, 
2009, p. 159). Furthermore, if there is a gender gap in voting it is likely related to the 
general left-right dimension, because it is the main dimension of politics in the EP (Hix, 
Noury & Roland, 2006).  
The variable ‘lrgen’ positions political parties by giving them a value between 0 and 
10. The value ‘0’ indicates an extreme left ideological stance and the value ‘10’ is given to 
political parties with an extreme right ideological stance. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
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does not provide values for political parties from Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg. Since 
the ideological differences in the political parties from these countries cannot be 
measured, these countries are excluded from the calculation. 
The ideological stances of MEPs can be measured with ‘Custum Tables’ in SPSS by 
using the ideological stances of political parties. Table 5 presents the ideological stances of 
both genders on a scale from 0 to 10 per country. Table 5 also provides the difference in 
political stances between female and male MEPs per country on a scale from -1 to 1. The 
third column shows the degree to which female parliamentarians have more left-wing 
political stances than male parliamentarians. The fourth column solely shows the degree 
to which the ideological stances of male and female MEPs differ per country.  
 
Table 5: ideological stances of female and male MEPs per country  
        Gender   
Female Male   
lrgen lrgen   
Mean Mean Difference Absolute difference 
     
Member 
state 
        
Austria                   4,47 5,24 0,77 0,77 
Belgium                 4,67 5,50 0,83 0,83 
Bulgaria                 5,10 5,16 0,06 0,06 
Czech 
Republic     
5,46 4,95 -0,51 0,51 
Denmark                5,06 4,79 -0,27 0,27 
Estonia                   3,31 5,19 1,88 1,88 
Finland                   6,33 5,48 -0,85 0,85 
France                     4,88 4,74 -0,14 0,14 
Germany                4,42 5,31 0,89 0,89 
Greece                    4,46 5,32 0,86 0,86 
Hungary                 4,76 5,93 1,17 1,17 
Ireland                   4,69 6,88 2,19 2,19 
Italy                        4,74 5,19 0,45 0,45 
Latvia                     6,75 7,35 0,60 0,60 
Lithuania               5,32 5,14 -0,18 0,18 
Netherlands           4,73 5,68 0,95 0,95 
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Poland                     6,17 6,39 0,22 0,22 
Portugal                  4,00 4,84 0,84 0,84 
Romania                 4,87 5,47 0,60 0,60 
Slovakia                  6,49 5,36 -1,13 1,13 
Slovenia                  5,55 5,51 -0,04 0,04 
Spain                    5,09 5,39 0,29 0,29 
Sweden                5,05 4,74 -0,31 0,31 
United 
Kingdom 
4,47 6,54 2,07 2,07 
5 Data analysis & Results  
A statistical analysis is required to determine if the gender gap in voting behaviour of 
MEPs is influenced by a country’s degree of social modernization and the ideological 
stances of MEPs. In order to answer the research question, correlation between the 
variables must be present. For this purpose, bivariate correlation analyses are conducted 
to find out the Pearson’s r values. Pearson’s r, also known as the product moment 
correlation coefficient, is a standardized measure of correlation (Argyrous, 2014, p. 236). 
Moreover, the degrees of association of the variables are not enough and the numerically 
influence of the independent and mediator variable on the dependent variable is also 
needed. Therefore, linear and non-linear regression analyses are performed. In addition, 
scatter plots are created to display the joint distribution.  
The Pearson’s r coefficients show that correlation is present between all variables 
and varies from weak to moderate. The relation between the gender gap in voting 
behaviour and social modernization is not strong and the same applies to the relation 
between social modernization and ideological stances. The relation between the gender 
gap in voting behaviour and ideological stances is the strongest. The overall relation is 
weaker than I theoretically anticipated, but this does not mean that the relations should 
be ignored.  
The results of the regression analyses on the influence of the independent on the 
dependent variable are provided in table 6. H1, H2 and H3 are accepted, because the 
requirement that influence must be present is fulfilled. The results show that social 
modernization is not a significant explanatory factor for the gender gap in voting 
behaviour, because the p-values are higher than 0.05. Along with the high p-values, when 
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we take r² into account, only 0.092 (9.2%) of the variation is explained by the regression 
analysis. Although, the independent variable is neither significant, nor explains a lot of 
the variation, it does provide a relation between the independent and dependent variable.  
This is also clear when the two variables are correlated. Social modernization 
shows an overall weak relation. The Pearson’s r coefficient for gender equality is 0.218 
and represents a weak positive correlation. Attitude towards women has a weak negative 
correlation with a Pearson’s r value of -0.041. When both indicators of social 
modernization are analyzed together to indicate the overall correlation, the Pearson’s r 
coefficient becomes 0.303.  
 
Table 6: regression analysis of the influence of social modernization on the gender gap in 
voting behaviour  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(constant) 0.110  
(0.011) 
0.110  
(0.011) 
-.0.004 
(0.078) 
Gender equality 0.001* 
(0.001) 
 0.002* 
(0.002) 
Attitude towards 
women 
 -0.002* 
(0.012) 
0.020* 
(0.019) 
R² 0.047 0.002 0.092 
Adj. R² 0.006 -0.042 0.009 
N 25 25 25 
Note: OLS-regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
****p < 0.001, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p > 0.05 
 
Next are the scatter plots. In figures 2 and 3, two things are immediately noticed. First, 
the United Kingdom stands out from other variables due to a high Phi value. Secondly, 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands are far ahead of other countries when it 
comes to gender equality. In figure 2, r² has a value of 0.047, while in figure 3 the r² value 
is higher with 0.050. Although there is no clear inverted u-shape, the values show that the 
non-linear regression analysis provides a better explanation for the gender gap in voting. 
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Figure 2: linear regression analysis of the influence of gender equality on the gender gap 
in voting behaviour 
 
 
Figure 3: non-linear regression analysis of the influence of gender equality on the gender 
gap in voting behaviour 
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Figure 4: linear regression analysis of the influence of attitudes towards women on the 
gender gap in voting behaviour 
 
 
Figure 5: non-linear regression analysis of the influence of attitudes towards women on 
the gender gap in voting behaviour 
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The Pearson’s correlation coefficient of social modernization and ideological stances is 
0.393. The Pearson’s r value between ideological stances and the gender gap is 0.434, but 
when the two outliers are removed, the value becomes 0.488. The mediator shows a 
moderately weak correlation with social modernization and a moderate correlation with 
the gender gap, which means that the relation with the gender gap is stronger.  
Table 7 shows for the influence of the independent on the mediator variable that 
0.154 (15.4%) of the variance is explained by the regression line. This is combined with an 
insignificant p-value (p > 0.05). The influence of the mediator is stronger on the dependent 
variable, it is even a significant explanatory variable with p < 0.05. The explained 
variance is 0.188 (18.8%) and without the outliers it becomes 0.239 (23.9%). This means 
that the ideological stances of MEPs have more influence on the gender gap in voting than 
the level of social modernization in the MEPs’ country. The amount of explained variation 
does not influence the acceptance of H4, because the influence is confirmed. When the 
independent and mediator variable are both presented in a regression analysis 
approximately 23% of the variance is explained. The results are not significant but do 
indicate that both variables influence the dependent variable. 
 
Table 7: regression analysis of the influence of the mediator and independent on the 
dependent variable, and the influence of the independent on the mediator variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(constant) 0.82  0.086 0.035 -0.735 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.079) (0.870) 
Differences in 
ideological stances  
Gender equality 
0.040** 
(0.018) 
0.032** 
(0.013) 
0.038* 
(0.020) 
0.001* 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.030* 
(0.17) 
Attitude towards women    0.001* 
(0.021) 
0.422* 
(0.219) 
R² 0.188 0.239 0.225 0.154 
Adj. R² 0.151 0.200 0.108 0.074 
N 24 22 24 24 
Note: OLS-regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
****p < 0.001, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p > 0.05  
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In figure 6, the largest outliers are the United Kingdom and Estonia. Ireland is also an 
outlier, but is more in line with the regression line. Ireland has one of the largest gender 
gaps in ideological stances and has the third highest Phi value. The United Kingdom has 
a large difference in ideological stances and as well has the highest Phi value, which 
causes the country’s positioning. Estonia also has a large gender gap in ideological 
stances, but also one of the lowest Phi values of all member states, which explains the 
country’s results. 
 
 
Figure 6: linear regression analysis of the influence of ideological stances on the gender 
gap in voting behaviour 
6 Conclusion and Discussion  
The thesis began by asking to what extent the gender gap in voting behaviour of MEPs is 
influenced by the MEPs’ member state’s level of social modernization. There can now be 
answered that social modernization affects the voting behaviour, albeit the influence is 
little. The developmental theory is not limited to national parliaments, because the theory 
is visible in national parliaments as well as the EP. The r² coefficient shows that social 
modernization explains a small percentage of the variation and is combined with high p-
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values and thus not significant. However, there is correlation between the two variables, 
because the Pearson’s r coefficient is 0.303.  
Furthermore, ideological stances acts as a mediator to a certain extent. The 
independent and mediator variable share a Pearson’s r value of 0.393, while the mediator 
and dependent variable have a Pearson’n r of 0.434. The latter relation has the only 
significant p-value (p < 0.05). Of all the analyzed relations, the strongest impact is that of 
ideological stances on the gender gap in voting behaviour. Perhaps something else 
influences ideological stances more than social modernization. One of them could be the 
different electoral systems in countries. Two-party systems do provide accuracy with 
ideologically placing political parties, but in multi-party systems people have more 
ideological information on political parties because coalition-formation is often necessary 
to govern (Drummond, 2010). The results also suggest that the gender gap cannot entirely 
be caused by social modernization or ideological stances on a European scale. The 
influence of the variables together is moderately weak, which suggests that these 
variables are most likely not the only elements that influence the gender gap. 
Nonetheless, all hypotheses are accepted, because the variables do influence the gender 
gap in voting behaviour. 
The study did not provide as strong results as I expected, but this is not completely 
out of line with the literature and maybe could have been expected beforehand. The 
gender gap in voting behaviour is most likely too complicated to explain with only the two 
analyzed variables in this study. The literature has offered various explanations for voting 
behaviour of which the main ones are EPGs and national political parties. Both might 
have a greater influence on the roll-call voting choices of MEPs. MEPs often vote in line 
with their national party and within political parties gender gaps in voting are small 
(Finke, 2014). If MEPs deviate from the norm, they could vote in line with EPGs (Hix, 
Noury & Roland, 2009). National interests can also have a part in influencing the voting 
behaviour of MEPs (Cicchi, 2013). 
 
Some of the interesting cases of this study are the outliers. In the United Kingdom there 
are many political parties with different ideological stances, from the far right to the far 
left. Perhaps these parties differ from the consensus more often, which causes the large 
gender gap. The opposite could apply to Estonia where political parties might be more 
ideologically close to one another.  
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 Other interesting cases are Cyprus and Malta. A gender gap in voting behaviour is 
impossible to have without female MEPs. This could indicate a low level of social 
modernization since women did not even make it into the EP, but on the other hand the 
delegations of these countries are very small which can also play a part in why there are 
no female MEPs. When there are women in the parliament, they are often members of 
left-wing parties, which explains their different voting behaviour from men. This is at 
least visible in the three countries with the highest Phi values. Furthermore, the results 
do not demonstrate a clear inverted u-shape for the dependent variable. The Nordic 
countries have the highest social modernization scores and are the closest to an equal 
society. They do not have the highest Phi values and their number of women in left-wing 
or right-wing parties is almost equal, which shows that H3 is applicable to a certain 
extent. This non-linear theory is more applicable on the influence of social modernization 
on ideological stances, where the expected u-shape is more visible as can be seen in the 
figures in the appendix.  
 
Finally, this study has a few limitations. One limitation is that RCVs are unrepresentative 
of all votes due to selection effects (Høyland, 2010, p. 181). RCVs are only held if they are 
explicitly requested by political groups (Hug, 2010, p. 226). This can create a biased 
sample. EPGs and large national delegations can have different reasons to request RCVs, 
such as the desire to make their position public, to see how other groups vote, or to enforce 
group cohesion (Høyland, 2010). Another limitation is that only EP6 was analyzed, which 
might have influenced the strength of the results. In order to strengthen the results, 
future studies should seek to decrease the number of limitations by for instance including 
other votes as well and using more EP terms instead of one. Despite the limitations, this 
study contributes to the understanding of elements associated with influencing the gender 
gap in voting behaviour. It extends previous studies by using an explanatory factor that 
had not been used on an international scale before.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: linear regression analysis of the influence of gender equality on ideological 
stances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: non-linear regression analysis of the influence of gender equality on ideological 
stances 
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Figure 9: linear regression analysis of the influence of attitude towards women on 
ideological stances 
 
 
Figure 10: non-linear regression analysis of the influence of attitude towards women on 
ideological stances 
